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Abstract 
In order to keep local public finances balanced, in many countries, measures restraining 
and controlling debt have been implemented. 
In Portugal such concerns have been considered too. Accordingly, several legal 
diplomas have been passed, namely local finances laws, defining rules, mainly related 
to limits and restrictions to interest, repayments of borrowings, as well as net debt level. 
Therefore, it should be expected that these legal restrictions would contribute to reduce 
municipal debt. 
Within this context, taking into consideration the institutional theory, particularly the 
coercive isomorphism perspective, this paper analyses the evolution of Portuguese 
municipalities’ debt aiming at assessing whether institutional pressures consubstantiated 
in the legal framework meanwhile approved have led to a common behaviour for 
effectively reducing debt. 
A six-year period was considered (2004-2009) following a positive approach and 
quantitative methodology. 
Findings show that, during that period, contrary to what was expected, except for 
Açores region, municipalities in all other regions have increased their net debt levels. In 
summary, it may be observed that the introduction of restrictive measures to Portuguese 
municipalities’ debt, during the analysed period, ceteris paribus, does not seem to have 
had the intended effects, i.e., debt reduction, hence raising questions about the 
effectiveness of legal control mechanisms. 
Keywords: Municipal debt, Debt limits, Institutional restrictions, Local government. 
 
 
 
 
 2 
1. Introduction 
Various countries in the European Union are making major efforts towards budgetary 
consolidation, in an attempt to meet the objectives related to the deficit, established in 
the Stability and Growth Pact1. 
It will only be possible to achieve that consolidation if there is reciprocal solidarity 
among all sub-sectors of Public Administration (PA). In this context, specifically for the 
Portuguese situation, Law no. 52/2011 of October 13, sets out in no. 2 of Art. 10-B that 
“The principle of reciprocal solidarity obliges all sub-sectors, through their organisms, 
to contribute proportionally to complying with the principle of budget stability in order 
to avoid situations of inequality”. Therefore, based on this idea, the Budget Framework 
Law (LEO)2 specifies that, in the State Budget Law (LOE) of the various years, to 
comply with the obligations of budget stability, debt limits must be established for the 
different sub-sectors. 
Accordingly, it will therefore be essential to manage and control municipal debt, and so 
various official public documents3 state it is fundamental that Local Administration 
(LA) participates fully in striving for budgetary consolidation in Public Administration. 
Mainly since 1979, various rules have been implemented in Portugal to restrict LA debt. 
Those rules predominantly take the form of successive local finance laws. In this 
context, the current Local Finance Law (LFL) (Law no. 2/2007 of January 15) sets out 
in Art. 35, that municipalities debt must adhere to the following objectives: 
minimization of direct and indirect costs from a long-term perspective; guarantee a 
balanced distribution of costs over the various annual budgets; guard against 
excessively concentrated amortisation periods and avoid exposure to excessive risk. 
In this context, considering the institutional theory and more specifically the coercive 
isomorphism perspective, in this research we will study the evolution of debt (from 
2004 to 2009), to be able to assess if formal pressures, in the form of the various norms 
attempting to limit debt, have led to municipalities showing a common behaviour, 
originating a reduction in debt. 
To achieve the objective defined, this study will be divided into four more sections, after 
this Introduction. Section 2 will be mainly theoretical and present a short literature 
review. In Section 3, a juridical-normative framework of Portuguese LA debt will be 
drawn up. The research methodology will be presented in Section 4. More precisely, the 
aim of the research will be defined, the research hypotheses presented and the 
collection, treatment and analysis of the data described. The results of the analysis will 
be described in Section 5. 
Finally, the main conclusions of the study, as well as some limitations and suggestions 
for future lines of research, will be presented. 
 
                                                 
1Approved by Resolution of the European Council on 17/06/97 (97/C 236/01), published in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities no. C 236, of August 2, 1997. 
2 Approved by Law no. 91/2001 of August 20. The last alteration to this Law implied it to be republished 
in Law no. 52/2011 of 13 October. 
3 E.g. Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality; Programme for 
Stability and Growth; European System of National and Regional Accounts; Budgetary Strategy 
Document 2012-2016. 
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2. Literature review 
Internationally, various studies have appeared, generally framed by the institutional 
theory, approaching the subject of institutional restrictions imposed fundamentally by 
the State, in the attempt to control LA debt. Among them stand out the studies by 
Farnham (1985), Kieweit & Szakaly (1996), Feld & Kirchgässner (2001), Salinas 
Jiménez & Álvarez García (2002, 2003), Vallés Giménez et al. (2003), Cabasés et al. 
(2007), Pascual Arzoz et al. (2008), Macedo & Corbari (2009) and Feld et al. (2011). 
One of the first investigations related to this topic was the one by Farnham (1985), who 
studied the effectiveness of limitations imposed by the State in two thousand and eighty 
seven localities in the United States of America (USA). He also studied the factors 
interfering with debt. Fundamentally, the author concluded that limits have a reduction 
effect on debt. 
Also in the USA, Kieweit & Szakaly (1996), in a study of fifty North-American States, 
found that the level of debt in a given period depends on the type of restrictions 
imposed by law. 
Feld & Kirchgässner (2001) conclude, among other aspects, that (legal) limitations of 
long-term planning do not restrict municipality debt. However, they found that citizens’ 
democratic power (democratic vote) will be a preponderant factor as they are 
considerably concerned about fiscal discipline. In another study (Feld et al., 2011) 
comparing results with the previous one, they conclude that alterations to the 
restrictions introduced in the scope of the New Public Management (NPM) do not have 
a significant influence on debt. 
In a study analysing the determinants of debt, Escudero Fernández & Prior Jiménez 
(2002) also researched empirically whether restrictions imposed by law have an effect 
on how municipality debt is managed. The results allowed them to confirm, concerning 
the impact of legal restrictions, that there are significant differences in the periods 
studied, which indicates that they do influence debt. 
In the same line, López Laborda & Vallés Giménez (2002) conclude that both norms of 
budgetary consolidation and limits imposed were effective, as they managed to 
moderate the growth of debt in Spanish autonomous regions. 
Salinas Jiménez & Álvarez García (2002, 2003), who consider that the application of 
debt limits as well as coordinating measures of fiscal policy are fundamental, also 
obtained results allowing them to validate the effectiveness of those restrictions. 
Vallés Giménez et al. (2003) and Cabasés et al. (2007) conclude that the evolution of 
institutional restrictions have led to municipalities not making excessive use of debt, 
and have therefore been effective. 
Pascual Arzoz et al. (2008) found that the norm regulating municipal debt is adjusted to 
theoretical control principles, which leads to its effective control. 
Macedo & Corbari (2009) also confirm the basic hypothesis, concluding that municipal 
debt was influenced by introduction of the law of fiscal responsibility. 
Based on the results summarised in Table 1, we gather that generally the various authors 
have validated hypotheses that legal restrictions influence debt. Such limitations seem 
to lead to entities, namely municipalities, adopting behaviour which tends to be 
identical, in reducing debt and complying with legal norms. Therefore, in the context of 
the institutional theory, a certain coercive isomorphism seems apparent. 
 Table 1 – Empirical studies about institutional restrictions 
Authors Sample/Period of analysis Objectives 
Farnham (1985) 
Sample: 2,087 localities in the United States 
of America, with over 10,000 inhabitants  
Period of analysis: 1976-1977 
Study the effectiveness of debt limits. Found that limits have a negativlocalities with the highest per ca
Kieweit & Szakaly 
(1996) 
Sample: 50 States in North-America  
Period of analysis: 1961-1990 
Study the relationship between debt and different types 
of restrictions stipulated in legal diplomas. 
Positive relationship between 
proportion of school-age popula
the level of debt, in a given perio
Feld & 
Kirchgässner 
(2001) 
Sample: 134 of the largest Swiss 
municipalities 
Period of analysis: 1990 
Study the restrictions of debt and its determinants. 
Conclude, among other aspec
planning do not restrict municip
the hypotheses that the number 
debt. 
López Laborda & 
Vallés Giménez 
(2002) 
Sample: 17 Spanish Autonomous Regions 
Period of analysis: 1987-1997 
Analyse the impact of different institutional 
mechanisms implemented to control debt, especially 
limits foreseen by laws. 
Conclude that both norms of bu
effective, as they managed to mo
Salinas Jiménez & 
Álvarez García 
(2002, 2003) 
Sample: 17 Spanish Autonomous Regions 
Period of analysis: 1986-1999 
Analyse the effective functioning of legal restrictions in 
relation to debt in Spanish Autonomous Regions. 
There is a relationship betwee
investment and debt. Regarding
did not find significant relevanc
obtained results allowing them to
Vallés Giménez et 
al. (2003) & 
Cabasés et al. 
(2007) 
Sample: Spanish municipalities 
Period of analysis 1988-1998 & 1988-2000 
Study restrictions to debt and elaborate a model with its 
explanatory determinants. 
Conclude that the evolution of i
avoiding excessive use of debt. 
tax revenue are the variables mo
 
 Table 1 – Empirical studies about institutional restrictions (Cont.) 
Authors Sample/Period of analysis Objectives 
Pascual Arzoz et 
al. (2008) 
Sample: 238 Spanish municipalities in the 
Autonomous Region of Navarra 
Period of analysis: 1995-2003 
Assess the effectiveness of norms on debt and its 
determinants. 
The norm regulating municipal
leads to its control. They highlig
as well as net savings. Reg
development, they conclude this
Macedo & 
Corbari (2009) 
Sample: Brazilian municipalities with over 
100,000 inhabitants 
Period of analysis 1998-2006 
Analyse whether the law of fiscal responsibility 
influenced debt. 
They confirm the basic hypothe
influenced by the law of fiscal re
Feld et al. (2011) 
Sample: 137 of the largest Swiss 
municipalities 
Period of analysis: 2004 
Study the restrictions to debt (compared to 1990) and its 
determinants. 
They conclude fundamentally t
scope of the NPM do not have 
that the number of inhabitants 
debt. 
Fernández Llera 
(2011) 
Sample: 17 Spanish Autonomous Regions 
Period of analysis: 1984-2008 
Assess the effectiveness of financial markets as a 
mechanism to restrict debt. 
They find that the discipline 
reasonably well regarding debt
influences debt. 
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3. Juridical-normative framework of debt in Portuguese LA 
3.1. Evolution of the juridical regime up to the LFL of 2007 
According to Cabo (2009), the different laws regarding local finance have established 
rules and procedures related to debt, fundamentally limiting the amount, restricting 
amortisation and interest charges and restraining recourse to credit as a function of the 
purposes of the loan. 
The first LFL (Law no. 1/79 of January 2) forced the Government to regulate 
municipalities’ loans4. To fulfil this purpose, Law-Decree no. 258/79 of July 28, was 
passed, stipulating the principal norms related to short, medium and long-term loans. 
Concerning medium and long-term loans, it set out that these could only by contracted 
for reproductive investment of a social or cultural nature, and also to restore 
municipality finances to a healthy state (Art. 3). Total annual charges of amortisation 
and interest, created by those investments could not exceed 20% of the amount 
budgeted for investment in the respective year (Art. 7). As for short-term debt, Art. 5, 
no. 1 established that loans could be contracted in any circumstances in the case of 
exceptional treasury difficulties, but could not be used for current expenditure and the 
amount could not at any time be over 1/12 of the amount budgeted for investment by 
the municipality in the respective year. 
Over the years, new local finance laws appeared, (the second – Law-Decree no. 98/84 
of March 29, and the third – Law no. 1/87 of January 6), presenting alterations of little 
significance. 
Later, Law no. 42/98 of August 6 set out in Art. 23, no. 2, that municipality debt 
should be guided by principles of rigour and efficiency, aiming to: a) minimize direct 
and indirect costs from a long-term perspective; b) guarantee balanced distribution of 
costs over the various annual budgets; c) prevent an excessively short period of 
amortisation; and d) prevent exposure to excessive risk. The debt limits established 
followed the same terms of the preceding laws. 
As PA deficit evolved, representing in 2001 4.4% of GDP, various measures related to 
municipal debt had to be taken between 2002 and 2007, among the most noticeable: 
  The LOE of 2002 (Law no. 109-B/2001 of December 27) foresaw in no. 2 of 
Art. 18 authorisation for the government to limit municipality debt, in an 
attempt to guarantee fulfilment of the objectives established for PA debt. With 
the approval of Law no. 16-A/2002 of May 31 (Rectifying Budget of 2002), 
municipalities and municipalities’ companies were prevented from contracting 
loans that implied increasing their net debt in the course of the budget year, 
with some exceptions. 
  In 2002, there was also an alteration to the LFL brought into effect by the 
Budget Stability Law (Organic Law no. 2/2002 of August 28). This law altered 
the LEO (Law no. 91/2001 of August 20, Title V). Therefore, in the terms of 
Art. 84 of the LEO and Art. 35-A of the LFL, it was determined that the LOE, 
for each year, could set limits for municipal debt, and these could be more 
restrictive than the ones foreseen in the LFL. 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that it was only in the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic of 1976 that greater 
autonomy was granted to municipalities, with definition of the basis of the financial relationship 
between central administration and municipalities. 
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  In 2003, the LOE (Law no. 32-B/2002 of December 30) continued the 
concerns about containing the deficit. In this connection, Art. 19 introduced 
some more restrictive measures regarding municipal debt. One of them (Art. 
19, no. 4) set out that the total amount of net debt in municipalities, including 
all forms of debt, could not exceed what existed at December 31, 2002. The 
LOE for 2003 also defined, in no. 1 of Art. 19, as the limit for interest and 
amortisation of medium and long-term loans, the higher of the following: an 
eighth of Basic, General and Cohesion Municipal Funds allocated to the 
municipality, or 10% of investment expenditure carried out by the 
municipality in the previous year. It prohibited recourse to new medium and 
long-term loans by municipalities that had already exceeded the limits set in 
no. 1 of Art. 19. Regarding the exceptions, they remained as before. 
  In 2004, 2005 and 2006 the respective State Budget Laws (Law no. 107-
B/2003 of December 31; Law no. 55-B/2004 of December 30; and Law no. 
60-A/2005 of December 30) maintained fundamentally the debt limits that had 
been set for 2003. 
It should be noted, however, that the LOE for 2006 clarifies in no. 5 of Art. 33, the 
concept of the financing need of ESA955, stating that “...it is the result of the 
difference between total financial liabilities, whatever their form, including 
contracted loans, financial leasing contracts and debts with suppliers, and total 
financial assets, namely, cash balance, deposits in financial institutions and treasury 
applications”. 
3.2. From the LFL of 2007 to the present 
The current LFL (Law no. 2/2007 of January 15) contains important alterations that 
essentially mean more restricted access to debt, so contributing to the sustainability of 
municipality finances and consequently that of PA. 
One of the guidelines of the current LFL, also present in the LOE for 2007 (Law no. 
53-A/2006 of December 29), is related to introducing the concept of municipality net 
debt. Accordingly, no. 1 of Art. 36 establishes that it will be “... equivalent to the 
difference between the sum of liabilities, whatever their form, including contracted 
loans, financial leasing contracts and debts with suppliers, and the sum of assets, 
namely cash balance, deposits in financial institutions, treasury applications and 
credit on third parties”. 
No. 2 of the same article introduces the concept of the total net debt of each 
municipality, which includes the net debt of municipal associations and entities 
integrating the local business sector for which it is responsible. 
According to Lobo & Ramos (2010), the model for determining debt limits is 
redefined, abandoning the definition of the limit as a function of interest and 
amortisation. Therefore, the fundamental rules related to debt stock limits are the 
following: 
a) “The total amount of net debt in each municipality, on 31 December each year, 
cannot be over 125% of the amount of revenue coming from municipal taxes, 
the municipality’s participation in the FEF, participation in IRS (individual 
                                                 
5 European System of Regional and National Accounts (ESA). 
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income tax) and derrama6, and from participation in the results of entities in the 
local business sector, relating to the previous year.” (Art. 37, no. 1). 
b) The amount of debt in each municipality relating to medium and long-term 
loans cannot exceed, on 31 December each year, the total revenue in the 
previous year eligible for calculating the limit of net debt (Art. 39, no. 2). 
c) At no time of the year can the amount of debt in each municipality relating to 
short-term loans exceed 10% of the value of revenue eligible for calculating the 
legal limit of net debt (Art. 39, no. 1). 
Failing to comply with debt limits makes municipalities subject to sanctions. Firstly, 
according to no. 2 of Art. 37 and no. 3 of Art. 39, when a municipality does not keep 
within the municipal net debt limit or the debt limit related to medium and long-term 
loans, it will be obliged to make an adjustment in each subsequent year of at least 
10% of the amount over the limit, until this is complied with. Secondly, going over 
the net debt limit foreseen for each municipality will mean a reduction by the same 
amount in the budgetary transfers due, in the following year, from the State sub-
sector, which will be affected to the Municipal Regulating Funds (Art. 5, no. 4). 
In addition, Law no. 2/2007 of January 15, defines other mechanisms for controlling 
debt with suppliers, most prominent among them being:  
- “Municipalities are prohibited from either accepting or withdrawing bills of 
exchange, granting sureties, subscribing to promissory notes, granting personal 
or real guarantees, except in the cases specifically foreseen in law” (Art. 38, no. 
10). 
- “Municipalities are prohibited from entering into contracts with financing 
bodies with the purpose of consolidating short-term debt, as well as passing 
over unmet credit.” (Art. 38, no. 12). 
- The obligation for municipalities to liquidate, in the period of one year, debts to 
third parties that, per supplier, are over a third of the total amount of the same 
type of debt (Art. 38, no. 9). 
As set out in the previous LFL, in the Budget Stability Law and in the LEO, it is also 
established in the current law that with a “...view to ensuring effective coordination 
between State finances and Municipality finances, the State Budget Law can define 
maximum limits for municipal debt which are different from those established in the 
current law.”. 
The LOE for 2008 (Law no. 67-A/2007 of December 31) and for 2009 (Law no. 64-
A/2008 of December 31) did not introduce significant alterations. It only made an 
exception to the debt limits foreseen in Law no. 2/2007 of January 15, for “...loans 
destined to finance investment in the sphere of the Initiative for Operations to Improve 
and Reintegrate Deprived Neighbourhoods, which must be previously authorised by a 
ruling by the member of Government responsible for the area of finances”. 
Also the LOE for 2010 (Law no. 3-B/2010 of April 28) maintained essentially the 
rules related to debt limits. We can therefore consider that the rules associated with 
municipalities’ debt, in force at present, are set out in the current LFL. It should be 
noted, however, that outside the limits, besides what is stated in the LOE for 2008, is 
the “… acquisition of housing…” in the scope of the Special Rehousing Programme 
                                                 
6 Derrama is a percentage of the companies’ income tax each municipality applies to the companies 
established in its territory. The percentage to be applied depends on the level of income. 
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in the Metropolitan Areas of Lisbon and Porto, and municipal rehousing programmes 
with the main objective of eradicating shacks and similar dwellings7. 
Following a more prudent and rigorous budgetary policy, and in the attempt to ensure 
reduced net debt in municipalities, the LOE for 2011 (Law no. 55-A/2010 of 
December 31) introduces important alterations. Thereby, no. 1 of Art. 53 stipulates 
that the value of net debt in each municipality cannot exceed what existed on 
December 30, 2010. 
Concerning medium and long-term loans, more restrictive measures are also 
introduced, with contracts “… being limited to the value resulting from the 
distribution of the total amount of amortisation carried out by municipalities in 2009, 
proportional to the debt capacity available to each municipality…” (Art. 53. no. 2 of 
Law no. 55-A/2010). 
The exceptions in calculating the value of net debt are also contemplated, and so no. 4 
of Art. 53 considers certain loans and amortisation, as long as duly justified and 
authorised, namely “…loans destined to financing investment supported by the 
Financing Mechanism of the European Economic Area – FMEEA in the scope of the 
Initiative for Operations to Develop and Reintegrate Deprived Neighbourhoods”. 
During 2011, various fundamental documents were published relating to Portuguese 
economic and budgetary policy8, which reveal even more the need for tight control of 
public debt. Associated to this, the LOE for 2012 (Law no. 64-B/2011 of December 
30) maintained, in relation to net debt, what was established in the LOE for 2011, 
altering the date of reference to December 31, 2011 (Art. 66, no. 1). 
As for medium and long-term loans, the law foresaw even more restrictive measures. 
Besides what is set out for 2011, no. 7 of Art. 66 considers that the value available for 
distribution will be reduced by 150 million euros. Some exceptions remained9 as long 
as duly justified and authorised by a member of Government (no. 5). 
The LOE for 2013 (Law no. 66-B/2012 of December 31) continues in the same 
direction as far as municipal debt is concerned, with no.1 of Art. 98 setting out that 
the limit for net debt in each municipality for 2013 must aim to ensure a zero total 
variation of net municipal debt as a whole. 
Regarding medium and long-term debt, the law sets out, in no. 8 of Art. 98, that the 
value available for allocation will also be reduced, as in 2012, by 150 million euros. 
 
 
                                                 
7 See Law-Decree no.159/2003 of July 18, which regulates the conditions for acquiring dwellings by 
municipalities and by the National Housing Institute in controlled-cost housing undertakings when 
destined to ensuring the rehousing of families under municipal rehousing operations. 
8 Namely, as mentioned above the Memorandum on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (signed 
by the Portuguese Government in May 2011, when Portugal was granted financial assistance by the EU 
and the IMF); Budgetary Strategy Document 2011-2015; Programme for Stability and Growth 2011-
2015; and the LEO. 
9 Taking into account the country's economic and financial situation, namely in the scope of both the 
QREN (National Strategic Reference Framework) and the urban improvement, and including the loan 
from the European Investment Bank (EIB). 
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4. Methodology 
4.1. Objective and research hypotheses 
To maintain balanced municipality finances, as far as debt is concerned, as seen 
above, various countries have implemented legal measures in an attempt to control it 
(Sousa Franco, 1991, Salinas Jiménez & Álvarez García, 2003). Also in Portugal, as 
we observe in Section 3, there have been concerns in this area. The various legal 
rulings, namely the various local finance laws, have defined rules, fundamentally in 
relation to the amount of debt and imposing limits for interest and amortisation (Cabo, 
2009).  
Consequently, during the period of analysis of this study (2004-2009), the rules to 
limit debt developed, with enforcement of the LFL of 2007 being fundamental. As 
explained in Section 3, this law established important alterations, essentially meaning 
greater restrictions in access to debt, so contributing to the sustainability of local 
finances, and consequently that of PA. It is also of note that the law referred to 
introduces, for the first time, restrictions relating to the net debt of each municipality. 
Therefore, considering the institutional theory, and more specifically the coercive 
isomorphism perspective, the main objective of this research will be to assess whether 
formal pressure (debt limits), in the form of legal rulings, have led the 308 Portuguese 
municipalities to show a common behaviour, resulting in reduced debt, during the 
period 2004 to 2009. Bearing in mind other investigations studying more specifically 
the effectiveness of restrictive measures (Farnham, 1985; Kieweit & Szakaly, 1996; 
Feld & Kirchgässner, 2001; Vallés Giménez et al., 2003; Cabasés et al., 2007 and 
Feld et al., 2011), as well as the specific characteristics of Portuguese regulations, we 
define the following hypotheses: 
H1: Municipal debt decreased during the period 2004 to 2009. 
H2: Municipal debt decreased significantly in the year 2007. 
H3: Municipal debt presents significant reductions after the year 2007. 
It is of note that there will be no assessment of the specific effectiveness of the 
various restrictive measures contained in the different rulings, but only if their 
implementation originated, in general terms, a reduction in net debt during the period 
of analysis10. 
Net debt per capita will be used as the study variable. Calculation of this indicator 
was based on what was set out in the regulations in force for the jurisdiction in 
question, namely the ESA95 and no. 1 of Art 36 of the current Portuguese LFL. 
Therefore, as presented above, it will be calculated by the difference between the 
value of financial liabilities (short, medium and long-term debt to be paid) and the 
value of financial assets (short, medium and long-term debt owed by third parties, 
short-term financial investments, deposits in financial institutions and cash balance), 
on 31 December, divided by the total number of inhabitants, in each year of analysis. 
According to no. 2 of Art. 36 referred to, calculation of net debt should be 
consolidated, i.e., it should include the proportion of the municipality’s participation 
in the capital of municipal associations and the local business sector. However, due to 
                                                 
10 As we observed in Section 3, initially restrictions were essentially related to short, medium and long-
term loans. From 2007, the restrictions became especially related to net debt. 
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the difficulty of gaining access to information, since many municipalities do not 
disclose their consolidated accounts online and they are not in each Municipalities’ 
Portal, this study will only consider the net debt of municipalities’ individual 
accounts. Additionally, some loans exempted from the limits were not considered. 
4.2. Data collection, treatment and analysis 
The data collected may be classified as secondary (Costa, 2012), since they derive 
essentially from databases. This classification is also justified due to them being held 
by third parties and not originally collected by us (Ferreira & Sarmento, 2009). 
Therefore, to obtain data, use will be made use of the database on the Municipalities’ 
Portal11. We will also use the database of the National Institute of Statistics (INE)12. 
Methodologically, this research is set within the quantitative positivist theory. It is 
therefore necessary to use data analysis tools that allow us to test the hypotheses. 
Data treatment will be based on various hypothesis tests, highlighting the following: 
to analyse the normality and homogeneity of the variables respectively, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and the Levene test will be carried out. In the case of not 
observing one of the assumptions for using parametric tests, we will use non-
parametric tests. Therefore, depending on the results of the previous tests, we will use 
the t-Student parametric test or the Wilcoxon non-parametric test to determine the 
equality of averages of municipal net debt per capita, for two paired samples, 
considering a level of significance of 5%. 
5. Results 
According to Alpendre & Almeida (2010), concerning budget consolidation strategy 
in Portugal, measures have been implemented to allow control of municipal debt, 
namely through definition of increasingly reduced debt limits for each municipality. 
As described in Section 3, there has been significant tightening of debt limits. From 
this perspective, based on coercive institutional isomorphism, those restrictions, 
ceteris paribus, should have resulted in reduced debt. 
In this section we will present the results of the hypotheses associated with the 
influence of legal restrictions on Portuguese municipal debt, beginning with a global 
analysis and thereafter by region. 
5.1. Global analysis 
Analysis of Table 2 shows that, contrary to what would be expected given the 
tightening of legal restrictions, net debt per capita presents a rising tendency during 
the period 2004-2009. The growth found between 2004 and 2009 was 57.2%, with 
slight decreases observed from 2005 to 2006 and from 2006 to 2007 (mean values). 
 
 
                                                 
11 www.portalautarquico.pt  
12 www.ine.pt  
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics of net debt per capita (€) 
  Minimum Maximum Mean 
2004 -804.060 2,942.790 517.929 
2005 -739.000 4,616.960 632.059 
2006 -789.350 3,975.670 625.568 
2007 -873.290 5,923.150 617.068 
2008 -824.560 6,517.520 669.804 
2009 -915.540 6,694.880 814.188 
 
This finding seems to show that, contrary to what was formulated in hypothesis H1, 
there is no reduction of debt levels during the period 2004 to 2009. This appears to 
demonstrate that the creation and implementation of restrictive measures in relation to 
municipal debt, ceteris paribus, have not been effective, since municipalities have 
continued to increase their debt. It should be noted that in calculating debt limits, 
some loans are exempted13 and, as referred, we did not take this into consideration. 
Nevertheless, as the total value, without considering exemptions, continues to 
increase, some doubts may be raised as to Portuguese municipalities’ contribution to 
consolidation of PA finances. 
For a based validation of the previous evidence, we checked whether the evolution of 
net debt per capita was significant during the period considered. As the net debt per 
capita (ENDLIQpc) for all the years does not present a normal distribution (Appendix 
I), we carried out the Wilcoxon non-parametric test to determine the equality of 
averages during two consecutive years, for two paired samples. 
The application of the Wilcoxon test (Table 3) allows rejecting the null hypothesis of 
equality of averages in net per capita debt between the years 2004 and 2005, 2006 
and 2007, 2007 and 2008, and 2008 and 2009, presenting a p-value of 0,000, 0,011, 
0,000 and 0,000 respectively. We can therefore conclude there is statistically 
significant growth of net debt per capita for the pairs of years 2004 and 2005, 2007 
and 2008, and 2008 and 2009. 
Between 2006 and 2007, there was a statistically significant reduction, a fact which 
could be due to the current LFL coming into effect. So based on this result, it would 
be possible to validate hypothesis H2. However, considering the results for the whole 
period, we find we cannot validate hypothesis H1. This result seems to indicate that, 
ceteris paribus, institutional pressure, in the form of legal rulings, have not led to 
municipalities showing a common behaviour resulting in diminished net per capita 
debt; on the contrary, the general tendency has been one of growth. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 For example, the current LFL (Law no. 2/2007 of January 15) exempts loans destined to finance 
programmes of urban renewal. The previous law (Law no. 42/98 of August 6), exempted those related 
to social housing, exceptional expenditure in the case of public calamity and investment co-participated 
by EU funds. 
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Table 3 – Wilcoxon test – Evolution of net debt per capita 
 Mean Standard deviation Z Sig. 
2005-2004 2004 517.929 523.469 -11.313a .000 
2005 632.059 606.081 
2006-2005 2005 632.059 606.081 -.584b .559 
2006 625.568 600.822 
2007-2006 2006 625.568 600.822 -2.533b .011 
2007 617.068 685.774 
2008-2007 2007 617.068 685.774 -6.480a .000 
2008 669.804 725.375 
2009-2008 
2008 669.804 725.375 
-10.953a .000 
2009 814.188 791.823 
a. Based on negative ranks.    
b. Based on positive ranks.    
 
For the pair of years 2005 and 2006, we find that despite diminished net debt per 
capita, this is not statistically significant. 
Analysing the years following the publication of the current LFL, i.e., after 2007, no 
significant reduction of net debt per capita was found (on the contrary, debt 
increased), and so nor can we validate hypothesis H3. 
All in all, we can conclude that, ceteris paribus, implementation of debt limits for 
municipalities does not seem to be contributing to its reduction. 
5.2. Regional analysis 
In this section we will also study the evolution of net debt per capita, based on a 
division by region, aiming to deepen and reinforce the results obtained in the global 
analysis. 
Concerning the year of 2004, the value of net debt per capita is € 517.93, for the 
whole country, while the region of the Açores presents the highest average, with € 
922.38 (Table 4). The Lisboa region, on other hand, has the lowest average net debt 
per capita (€ 298.76). 
In 2005 a slight increase is found in relation to 2004, rising to € 632.06 for the whole 
country. The region showing the highest figure continues to be the Aores with € 
1,001.89. Lisboa continues to be the region with the lowest average net debt per 
capita (€ 329.99). 
In 2006 and 2007, the tendency to grow is broken, and a small reduction is found, but 
without returning to 2004 levels. As for the regions with the lowest and highest 
values, they are the same as in 2004 and 2005, i.e., Lisboa and the Açores 
respectively. 
2008 and 2009 once again show a rising tendency, and the regions with the lowest and 
highest net debt per capita remain unchanged. In 2009, very significant increases are 
recorded in the regions of Algarve and Madeira. 
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Table 4 – Net debt per capita (€) by region (2004-2009) 
Region 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Norte 505.54 621.74 629.42 635.31 677.60 773.78 
Centro 495.24 606.82 603.31 625.40 682.99 805.06 
Lisboa 298.76 329.99 312.12 290.51 319.02 380.15 
Alentejo 502.03 640.81 657.25 621.64 658.69 796.58 
Algarve 469.64 541.60 488.16 419.59 535.88 991.63 
Açores 922.38 1,001.89 1,022.90 1,023.88 1,077.44 1,175.54 
Madeira 617.33 857.97 630.77 463.11 579.21 1,095.30 
Total 517.93 632.06 625.57 617.07 669.80 814.19 
 
Considering the previous analysis, there seems to be evidence that in terms of net debt 
per capita in the different regions, a general increase was registered during the period 
of analysis. 
Seeking to validate the previous evidence, we also checked whether the evolution of 
the level of net debt per capita was significant during that period. To do so we 
followed the method used for the general analysis, i.e., the Wilcoxon test. 
Table 5 – Wilcoxon Test – Evolution of net debt per capita in the Norte region 
 Mean Standard deviation Z Sig. 
2005-2004 
2004 505.542 408.636 
-6.741a .000 
2005 621.742 466.383 
2006-2005 2005 621.742 466.383 -.174b .862 
2006 629.420 501.793 
2007-2006 2006 629.420 501.793 -.239a .811 
2007 635.310 533.369 
2008-2007 2007 635.310 533.369 -3.301a .001 
2008 677.597 577.857 
2009-2008 
2008 677.597 577.857 
-5.385a .000 
2009 773.778 616.179 
a. Based on negative ranks.    
b. Based on positive ranks.    
 
As can be observed in Table 5, the Norte region presents, as was found for the country 
as a whole, an overall tendency for net per capita debt to grow, and in this case, for 
the entire period 2004 to 2009. As for statistical significance, this is only found 
between the years 2004 and 2005, 2007 and 2008, and 2008 and 2009, rejecting the 
hypothesis of equality of average net debt, and allowing the conclusion there is a 
statistically significant increase. 
In the Centro region (Table 6), the test allows rejection of the hypothesis of equality 
of averages for the pairs of years 2004-2005, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009, since they 
present a p-value < 0.05. For the other years, there is no statistically significant 
evidence; however, in the year the LFL was published, net debt per capita actually 
shows an increase. 
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Table 6 – Wilcoxon Test – Evolution of net debt per capita in the Centro region 
 Mean Standard deviation Z Sig. 
2005-2004 2004 495.236 531.564 -6.953a .000 
2005 606.816 650.008 
2006-2005 2005 606.816 650.008 -.640a .522 
2006 603.310 596.809 
2007-2006 2006 603.310 596.809 -1.059b .290 
2007 625.397 783.460 
2008-2007 2007 625.397 783.460 -3.545a .001 
2008 682.993 832.890 
2009-2008 
2008 682.993 832.890 
-7.502a .000 
2009 805.062 853.262 
a. Based on negative ranks.    
b. Based on positive ranks.    
 
As for the Lisboa region, analysis of Table 7 also shows rejection of the hypothesis of 
equality of averages from the pair of years 2006-2007, with statistically significant 
differences. In this region, there is a statistically significant reduction, with a p-value 
of 0.049 (0.098/214) and 0.031 (0.062/2), of net debt per capita in the years 2005-
2006 and 2006-2007, allowing strengthened validation of H2. From that year on, the 
tendency changes, observing a statistically significant increase in debt. 
Table 7 – Wilcoxon Test – Evolution of net debt per capita in the Lisboa region 
 Mean Standard deviation Z Sig. 
2005-2004 2004 298.762 293.597 -1.538a .124 
2005 329.991 350.084 
2006-2005 2005 329.991 350.084 -1.657b .098 
2006 312.116 381.334 
2007-2006 2006 312.116 381.334 -1.870b .062 
2007 290.509 400.436 
2008-2007 2007 290.509 400.436 -2.391a .017 
2008 319.019 401.055 
2009-2008 
2008 319.019 401.055 
-3.290a .001 
2009 380.150 379.879 
a. Based on negative ranks.    
b. Based on positive ranks.    
Regarding the Alentejo region (Table 8), the hypothesis of equality of averages is 
rejected for all pairs of years except 2005-2006 (p value > 0.05). It is of note that the 
reduction observed from 2006 to 2007 is statistically significant (0.065/2), which also 
allows corroboration of H2. 
 
 
                                                 
14 As the p-value presented in the table is for the bilateral test, this value will have to be divided by two, 
since the intention is to do a unilateral test (Marôco, 2010). 
 16 
Table 8 – Wilcoxon Test – Evolution of net debt per capita in the Alentejo region 
 Mean Standard deviation Z Sig. 
2005-2004 2004 502.028 578.053 -5.393a .000 
2005 640.811 627.971 
2006-2005 2005 640.811 627.971 -.708a .479 
2006 657.249 639.375 
2007-2006 2006 657.249 639.375 -1.847b .065 
2007 621.641 672.162 
2008-2007 2007 621.641 672.162 -2.605a .009 
2008 658.692 703.799 
2009-2008 
2008 658.692 703.799 
-4.920a .000 
2009 796.578 769.422 
a. Based on negative ranks.    
b. Based on positive ranks.    
 
Table 9 – Wilcoxon Test – Evolution of net debt per capita in the Algarve region 
 Mean Standard deviation Z Sig. 
2005-2004 2004 469.636 548.095 -1.138a .255 
2005 541.597 529.126 
2006-2005 2005 541.597 529.126 -1.551b .121 
2006 488.156 579.320 
2007-2006 2006 488.156 579.320 -1.551b .121 
2007 419.593 633.224 
2008-2007 2007 419.593 633.224 -2.379a .017 
2008 535.878 650.377 
2009-2008 
2008 535.878 650.377 
-3.103a .002 
2009 991.631 490.187 
a. Based on negative ranks.    
b. Based on positive ranks.    
In the Algarve region (Table 9), which also presents a general tendency to grow 
during the period of analysis, the hypothesis of equality of averages (p value < 0.05) 
can only be rejected for the pairs of years 2007-2008 and 2008-2009. So for these 
pairs of years, the growth of net debt per capita is significant. 
Concerning the Açores region (Table 10), just as in the previously analysed regions, 
we find a general tendency for net per capita debt to grow. Nevertheless, the 
hypothesis of equality of averages (p value < 0.05) can be accepted for all pairs of 
years analysed, except for that of 2004-2005. Therefore, overall, we can conclude 
there are no statistically significant differences in the growth of net debt per capita 
during that period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
Table 10 – Wilcoxon Test – Evolution of net debt per capita in the region of the Açores 
 Mean Standard deviation Z Sig. 
2005-2004 2004 922.377 714.053 -1.972a .049 
2005 1001.889 801.341 
2006-2005 2005 1001.889 801.341 -.483b .629 
2006 1022.898 944.100 
2007-2006 2006 1022.898 944.100 -.362a .717 
2007 1023.881 984.291 
2008-2007 2007 1023.881 984.291 -.805a .421 
2008 1077.438 1052.640 
2009-2008 
2008 1077.438 1052.640 
-.684a .494 
2009 1175.542 1319.706 
a. Based on negative ranks.    
b. Based on positive ranks.    
For the region of Madeira (Table 11), the hypothesis of equality of averages can be 
rejected for all years (the p-value figures divided by 2, for the reasons presented 
above are below 0.05), with a significant increase in debt for the pairs of years 2004-
2005, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009. For the pairs of years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, a 
significant reduction is registered, which also allows corroboration of H2.  
Table 11 – Wilcoxon Test – Evolution of net debt per capita in the region of Madeira 
 Mean Standard deviation Z Sig. 
2005-2004 2004 617.335 584.380 -1.867a .062 
2005 857.967 831.556 
2006-2005 2005 857.967 831.556 -1.867b .062 
2006 630.774 449.127 
2007-2006 2006 630.774 449.127 -1.867b .062 
2007 463.107 341.364 
2008-2007 2007 463.107 341.364 -1.867a .062 
2008 579.205 320.165 
2009-2008 
2008 579.205 320.165 
-1.778a .075 
2009 1095.305 946.869 
a. Based on negative ranks.    
b. Based on positive ranks.    
Summarizing, it can be stated there seems to be statistical evidence that during the 
period of analysis, contrary to what would be expected, except for the region of the 
Açores, all the others increased significantly their level of net per capita debt, which 
means rejection of H1. 
As for the statistically significant reduction of values for the pair of years 2006-2007, 
this is found in the regions of Lisboa, Alentejo and Madeira. Therefore, as in the 
global analysis, we validate H2 for these regions. 
It is therefore found that, although in general, the introduction of measures to restrict 
the level of debt in Portuguese municipalities, during the period of analysis, does not 
appear to have led to its reduction, there seems to have been some effect in the first 
year of enforcement of the 2007 LFL. Still, this conclusion does not agree with the 
results obtained by Farnham (1985), Vallés Giménez (2002), López Laborda & Vallés 
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Giménez (2002), Ashworth et al. (2005), Cabasés et al. (2007), Geys (2007) and 
Hájek & Hájková (2009), as these authors validated the hypothesis related to the 
effectiveness of measures restricting municipality debt. As mentioned above, this 
situation can be explained by the fact that the majority of municipalities still have a 
margin concerning debt limits, and so the restrictions imposed do not affect them. 
Secondly, the non-existence of heavy sanctions for failing to comply with debt 
limits15, could lead to a lack of concern in managing it. 
6. Conclusions 
The results obtained give empirical support to the idea that the various restrictive 
measures related to municipal debt did not lead to its reduction during the period of 
analysis, observing, on the contrary, an increase. Nevertheless, the significant 
reduction found in the year the LFL of 2007 took effect, may show that those in 
charge of municipalities became more concerned and attentive during that year. 
However, in the following years (2008 and 2009), once again there was a sharp 
increase, which seems to indicate some lack of effectiveness of the legal 
mechanisms16. 
In these circumstances, it will be fundamental that, besides insisting on compliance 
with the limits established in the LFL, legislative measures for tighter control 
continue to be implemented. A good example to be followed was publication of Law 
of Commitments and Delayed Payments (Law no. 8/2012 of February 21)17. Also 
greater scientific development, to which we aim to contribute with this research, could 
draw attention to the need to control municipalities’ debt. 
This line of research would benefit from an extension to consider the consolidated net 
debt of the whole ‘Municipal Group’. Additionally, we believe it would be interesting 
to study the effectiveness of normative limitations related to debt, essentially after 
implementation of the LFL of 2007, seeking to assess how each of the limits defined 
therein contributes to control of debt. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 According to no. 2 of Art. 37 of the LFL, “When a municipality does not comply with the ruling in 
the previous number, it must reduce in each subsequent year at least 10% of the amount exceeding its 
net debt limit, until that limit is reached”. 
16 According to information on the Municipalities’ Portal, in 2008 and 2009, 51 and 71 municipalities, 
respectively, went over their debt limits. 
17 Approved the rules applicable to the assumption of commitments and delayed payments by all public 
entities; regulated by Law-Decree no. 127/2012 of June 21. 
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Appendix I – Testing the normality of net debt per capita / year 
 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
ENDLIQpc2004 .132 308 .000 .873 308 .000 
ENDLIQpc2005 .133 308 .000 .835 308 .000 
ENDLIQpc2006 .120 308 .000 .874 308 .000 
ENDLIQpc2007 .135 308 .000 .823 308 .000 
ENDLIQpc2008 .152 308 .000 .803 308 .000 
ENDLIQpc2009 .159 308 .000 .794 308 .000 
 
